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PEST INFORMATION  MARKETS  AND  INTEGRATED  PEST  MANAGEMENT
Michael  E.  Wetzstein
Integrated  pest  management  (IPM)  programs  AN  OPTIONAL  JOINT-IMPACT
vary from employing field scouts to planting trap  COMMODITY
crops,  as  inputs  in production,  to  control  crop  Pest information  is currently being provided in
losses. Scouts provide pest information,  helping  a n  er of form  Proucr  y  prive or a number of forms. Producers may pay private or to determine the need for pesticide  applications.  consultants  for pest information,  or they public  consultants  for pest  information, or they This increased information  may indicate  a reduc-
may receive it as  a service  from a governmental tion  of  periodic  application,  which  would  di-  ooperative  Extension agency, for example,  the Cooperative  Extension minish  the  negative  external  effects  that  such  Seice  nestigation  into the  supply  of infor- Service.1 Investigation  into the  supply  of infor- treatments have  on environmental  quality.  charactered  as  a joint mation  reveals  that it is  characterized  as  a joint
Recent  research  in  this  area  has  determined  impact  commodity.2 That  is,  other  agricultural
the  need for pest information  (Regev et al.)  and  producers  can  utilize  the  information  obtained
the rationale  for established information  markets  from  a producer  who  acquires  the  information
(Feder).  Currently,  such  sources  exist  through-  (the  participant)  without  subtracting  from  the
out  the United  States,  and  both public  and pri-  participant's utility. A nonparticipant may obtain
vate  consultants  supply  information  to  agricul-  the  participant's  information  from a county  ex-
tural producers.  tension  agent,  by  attending  extension  or  other
Regev  et  al.  conclude  that these  unregulated  local  meetings,  or by talking directly to the  par-
markets  will  not  yield  an  optimal  allocation  of  ticipant.  Thus,  participation  by  a  producer  in-
resources.  Information  provided  to  one  agricul-  creases  the  information  available  to  nonpartici-
tural producer may be readily applied by another  pating  producers  with regard  to  optimal  timing
producer  at zero  marginal  input  cost.  In  an un-  and  application  of pesticides.
regulated  market, this  positive external  effect is  Pest information  possesses joint-impact  char-
not considered in the selling price of the informa-  acteristics  and  is also characterized  by asymme-
tion.  Thus,  in  evaluating  pest  information  pro-  try.  Participants'  information  affects  nonpartici-
grams, the  benefits  received from them  may  be  pants utility,  but nonparticipants'  actions do not
understated.  As  a  result,  increased  attention  is  affect  participants'  utility.  This  assumption  is
being placed  on accounting for this  external  ef-  reasonable for a given season if it is assumed that
fect (Smith).  This paper investigates  the  market  intraseasonal  pest  migration  between  fields  is
for pest information and discusses whether regu-  negligible.  However, in terms of an interseasonal
lated markets would be more efficient than would  perspective,  a pesticide management program by
unregulated markets.  one producer may affect pest population dynam-
In  the  first section,  pest  information  charac-  ics or resistance for the region as a whole (Hueth
teristics  are  investigated  in  order  to  determine  and  Regev).  Information  in this  case  exhibits  a
the  effects  of this  input  on production.  This  in-  symmetrical joint effect.
formation  will  be  useful  to producers  who  em-  Pest  information  obtained  by  nonparticipants
ploy  the  information  (participants),  as  well  as  from participants is not directly related to a non-
those  who  receive  a  positive  external  effect  participant's  production  process.  The  informa-
(nonparticipants)  from  the participating  produc-  tion may not be a perfect substitute  for data that
ers.  Given  the  characteristics  of pest  informa-  nonparticipants would have obtained if they were
tion,  a model  is  then  developed  to account  for  participants,  and  nonparticipants  may  discount
pest  information  and  risk  preference  in  a pro-  the  available  information  from  participants  in
ducer's  decision  function.  The  final  section  their utility function.  Less  discounting results  in
summarizes  the results and explores  the implica-  greater substitution and degree of jointness. Pest
tions of unregulated versus regulated markets for  information  is  also  an  optional  joint-impact
pest information,  commodity  in that the cost of not using it is zero.
The  author is  Assistant Professor,  Department of Agricultural  Economics,  University  of Georgia.
'  It  is assumed  in this paper that private consultants  are not agents for pesticide  producers.  For a discussion of private consultants  related to pesticide producers,  refer to
Feder,  Hall.
2 Joint-impact  commodities  have  often been  referred to  in economic  literature  as public goods,  consumption  externality, non-rivalness  in consumption.  For a composite
discussion  of these terms,  refer  to Schmid.
79That is, information available by participants can  Equation  (2) states  that the addition to  the vari-
potentially  enter  nonparticipants  utility  func-  ance of 7r given an additional unit of the input x is
tions; however,  it may  not actually do  so either  equal to the output price  squared times marginal
because  of possible  exclusion  or  avoidance.  risk. Price squared (p
2 ) is positive, but the sign of
Thus, nonparticipants  have the option of using or  marginal  risk  is  subject  to  empirical evaluation;
not using participants'  information, provided that  however, marginal risk is positive for most inputs
participants  do not attempt to suppress  it.  (Batra).  IPM is  a method designed to  encourage
producers  to purchase pest information as insur-
ance  against  risk  at  the  expense  of  pesticides.
PEST  INFORMATION  MODEL  This  implies
Incorporating the above characteristics  of pest  (3)  aV(7r)/ax  = p2(aV(4)/Ox)  < 0.
information  inputs  into  economic  theory  yields
valuable policy insights for pest management.  In  Given  that  the  major  motivation  for pest  in-
a partial equilibrium  framework,  individual  pro-  formation  and  pesticide  applications  is  risk  re-
ducer's  production  and  cost  functions  are  pre-  duction,  agricultural  producers  would  generally
sented to analyze  the role of prices  in pest infor-  consider risk in their preference  ordering,  U(Tr).
mation  allocation.  Levy and Markowitz  demonstrated that the first
Profit,  7r,  resulting  from  the  application  pest  two  moments  of  Taylor  series  approximation
information  can be defined  as  closely  approximates  preference  ordering  and
yields  a utility function for U[E(7T)]  as
rT  = pO  (x, z)  - rx  - wz
U  =  U[E(7T)]  +  U2[E(7)]V(7T)/2.
where  p  is  the  market price,  +(x,  z)  is  the pro-
ducers production function, x is a (1 by V) vector  Thus,  the utility of a risk prospect rr  is assumed
of pest information,  z is a (1 by Z) vector of pro-  to be equal to the utility function evaluated at the
duction  inputs  other  than  information,  r is  the  mean  of  rT  plus the  products  of the second  mo-
price vector associated with x,  and w is the price  ment  of  Tr, the  corresponding  derivative  of the
vector associated with z. Assuming that output  b  utility  function, and the inverse factorial.3
and  product price  p  are  stochastically  indepen-  The  first-order  conditions  for a maximization
dent, the mean of profit is given by  of U  =  U[E(Tr),  V(Tr)],  assuming  that the  utility
function is quadratic or that  rT's are normally dis-
E(7r)  = E(p  - rx  - wz)=  E(p)E(0)  - tributed,  yield
rx  - wz, rx  - wz,  au/ax  =  [0U/0E(7r)]  [aE(r)/ax]  +
[au/av('rr)]  [ aV(77r)/ax]  =  0.4
where  E  is  the  expectations  operator.  Differ-  [  V()] [V(  ]  =
entiating  E(rr)  with  respect  to  x  under  the  as-  This  implies
sumption  of perfect  competition  in the  product
and input markets, so that p is nonstochastic E(p)  (4)  aE(r7)/bx  +
=  p and V(p)  = 0,  yields  {[aU/aV(7T)]/[!U/OE(7r)]}aV(7r)/Ox  =  0.
(1)  E(r)/x  =pE()/x  - r~.  The  ratio  in  the  brackets  measures  the  rate  of
utility  substitution between  E(rT)  and  V(r). This
is the negative of the slope of an iso-utility curve The  E(rT)  is  thus  maximized  when  the  value  of  in (E V)  space  or the negative  of the risk evalua-
expected  marginal  product  is  equal to  the input  tion differential quotient  REDQ (Magnusson).
price.  Substitution of equations  (1) and (2) into equa-
Variance  of  is  expressed  as  tion (4),  assuming perfect  competition  and rear-
ranging terms,  yields
V(TT)  =  V(po  - rx  - wz)
=  [E(p)]2V(O)  +  [E(()] 2 V(p)  +  (5)  r =  p0E(O)/0x  - REDQ  [p2aV(O)/ax].
V(p)V(().
The  optimal  value  of x occurs  when the  mar-
Differentiating  with  respect  to  x  given  perfect  ginal  input  cost  equals  the  value  of  expected
competition,  V(p)  =  0, results  in  marginal  product  minus  REDQ  times  price
squared  and marginal  risk. The  modification  for
(2)  aV(rT)/0x  = p2(0V(4)/&x).  profit  maximization  under  certainty  is  apparent
3 Higher moments  such as  skewness  and  kurtosis could  be included in the utility  function.  Incorporating  these moments  yields
U(rr)  =  U[E(tr)]  +  U.2[E(7r)]E[7r-E(7r)]2/2  +  UL:[E(ur)]E[7r  - E(7r)]3/6  + *  '  ·
Higher  moments  were  excluded  from  the  utility  function  because  the  first  two moments  closely  approximate  the function  and  the  higher  moments  do  not  enrich  the
conclusions drawn  from this  paper.
4 The  second-order  conditions  for the  existence  of a maximum  are very  involved  and  obscure;  therefore,  they  are not  presented.  An  interested  reader may  refer  to
Magnusson  for  a discussion of these conditions.  In  addition,  Anderson,  et  al.  state that since  any  serious empirical  work will  probably  resort to  numerical  exploration  of
conditional expected  utility  surfaces,  the second-order  conditions  will  automatically  be taken  into account.
80in equation (5).  A producer will attempt to equate  mation  and  producer  risk  preference.  Table  1
input cost to expected marginal product minus  a  lists four cases of different combinations of cross
marginal risk deduction.  input effects  (jointness) and risk preference.
Given risk aversion on the part of producers,  In  the  first  case,  non-jointness  and  no  risk
preference  are assumed. Thus,  a participant  will
(6)  aU/aV(7r)  < 0 and aU/0E(rr) >  0,  equate  marginal  input  cost  to  the  value  of ex-
pected marginal product.  The nonparticipant will
implies  REDQ is greater than  zero.  In addition,  not participate  at this  level  of cost,  because  the
given equation  (3),  value of expected  marginal  product  is  less  than
the  marginal  input  cost for  the  nonparticipant.
p
2 OV(Oq)/Ox  <  0.  Given  non-jointness  and  no  risk  preference,
there  exists  no  market  failure.  Optimal  institu-
That is, more pest information will be demanded,  tional poli  oul  then  e to pr  e te 
given risk aversion,  under uncertainty than under given  sk aversion,  under uncertainty than under  keting of pest information and provide incentives
~~~~~~~certainty.  ^for the  reduction in cost of providing pest infor-
mation.
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  Case  two  introduces  risk  preference,  given
non-jointness.  In  this  case,  the  participant  em-
ploys  pest  information  beyond  the  point  where Pest  information  is  an  optional  joint-impact  marginal  input  cost  equals  value  of  expected
good  and,  as such,  nonparticipants  are  affected  marginal  product  because  of uncertainty.  As
by a participant's  use  of a pest information  pro-  dr notd  pt  of  the  uncertainty  regarding gram  . Let  . be pest informationinputsobtFeder  noted,  part  of the  uncertainty  regarding gram.  Let  pest infor  n i  t  pest  nformatrol  is a result of genuine  random factors,
from participants  and x" be pest inf-  while  there is  a pormtion  that is perceived by the
taned  from  nonparticipants  receiving  pest  in-  producer  because  of insufficient  knowledge.
formation  from  participants.  Thus  a participant  These  two  elements  of  uncertainty  are  readily
will equate  These  two  elements  of  uncertainty  are  readily
apparent in equation (5).  Marginal risk is the por-
r =  paE(p)/ax'  - REDQ [p2aV(0)/ax'].  tion of uncertainty  that is composed  of genuine
random factors,  whereas  REDQ is  the perceived
That is,  the marginal input  cost of pest informa-  random variation  by producers.
tion is equated to the expected  marginal product  If marginal risk is  zero, that is,
of information  minus  the  marginal  risk  deduc-
tion.  However,  the  nonparticipant  receives  the  aV(0)/9x  =  0,
pest  information  at  zero  marginal  input  costs.
pTt iorm  on  at  zro mr  l  i  t  co.  then optimal policy  would be to equate the mar-
'That i,  ginal  input  cost  to  value  of  expected  marginal
0 = paE(o)/ax"  - REDQ  [p2V(0)/ax"]].  product.  Given  this  marginal  risk  assumption, 0 = pOE()/Ox"  - REDQ  [p2V(b)/Ox"]. producers  should then be made  aware of the fact
that pest information does not decrease variation Alternative  pricing  implications  result,  de-  in  yield.  Thus,  producers  should  not  purchase
pending on  the degree  of jointness  of pest infor-  additional units  of pest information  as insurance
against  random  variation  in  yields.  Instead,  if
TABLE  1:  Input  Effect  and  Risk  Preference  REDQ is zero and marginal risk is non-zero, then
Related to Model  Implications  producers  have  no  risk  preference  and  will
equate  marginal input  cost  to value  of expected
Nonparticipant  marginal  product.  In  this  case,  if society  is  in-
Input  Risk  Model  terested in decreasing random variation in yields,
Case  Effect  Preference  Implications
Case  Effect  Preference  Implications  it  would  have  to  encourage  implementation  of
1  aE(M/Dx"  =  0  no  r  >  paE()/ax2'  additional  management  procedures  directed  to-
1  E(%)/3x"  =  0  no  r  > p9E({)/8x' ward decreasing variation in yields: for example,
2  3E()/3x''  =  0  yes  r  >  paE(<)/ax'  provide more incentives for producers to employ
- RED^Q{p  av(¢)Ix'}  pest information  that diminishes  yield variation.
3  aE(4)/ax"  >  0  no  r  > P3E(.)/ax'  The  magnitude  of  marginal  risk  deduction  de-
o  < paE(q)/ax"  pends  on the  level  of REDQ  and  marginal  risk
4  E(3x  >  yes  r  >  pE(/that  must be assessed empirically.5
4  3E(()/Dx"  >  0  yes  r  >  p3E(«)/Wx  '
- REDQ{p
2
aV()/ax'}  In  addition,  given  case  two,  more  producers
are likely  to participate  because of the incentive
o <  paE(<)/ax"  to  insure  against  risk.  If the expected  marginal
_____-  REDQ{pV(__/ax  "product  of participants  is  equal  to the  expected
marginal product of nonparticipants,
s This discussion has  assumed that the variance in yield remains constant on the interval of pest information;  however, this assumption  may not be true in practice.  For the
implications of this type  of heteroscedasticity,  refer  to Feder.
81aE(p)/ox'  participants  =  with case  two, a producer may still participate  if
aE(O)/x'  [ nonparticipants,
r = p0E(0)/ax'  I participant  =
then  the  difference  in  participation  versus  non-  pEE(/)/ax'  nonparticipant,
participation  is  the  net  marginal  risk  deduction
between  participating  and  nonparticipating  pro-  because  of net  marginal  risk  deduction.  In  this
ducers. Again, this case does not result in market  case  the producer may choose not to participate
failure;  however,  additional  pest information  is  and become a free rider. In the extreme case, this
employed here  compared to case one because  of  results  in
risk  preference.  Therefore,  the  need  to  reduce
pest  information  cost  is  not  as  certain  in  this  (7)  r  pE(o)/Ox'  participant 
case.  p0E(0)/0x"  I nonparticipant.
A more realistic assumption, case three,  is that
some  degree  of jointness  exists.  That  is,  the  Therefore,  producers  would  generally  become
greater the degree  of jointness, the  more the ex-  free  riders.  However,  for  some  producers,  the
pected marginal product of x" deviates from zero.  marginal  risk deducin  r  arition  or participationis  dif-
First,  assuming  again  no  risk  preference,  the  ferent from the marginal  risk deduction for non-
nonparticipant  does not participate  because  r >  participation,  even  given equation  (7).  Thus the
paE(()/&x'.  But the nonparticipant  does  employ  net  marginal  risk  deduction  in this  case  distin-
the  pest information  obtained  by the participant  guishes  between  those  who  participate  versus
at  zero  marginal  cost.  Thus,  to  some  degree,  those who do not. That is,  the reasonfor partici-
market failure is present as a result of the effects  pation versus  nonparticipation  is  not only a dif-
of wealth  distribution.  Participants  pay  for the  ference  in  expected  marginal  product,  but also
information,  while  nonparticipants  receive  it  at  differences  in risk preference.  In effect,  partici-
zero cost. Efficiency  is obtained when producers  pants are purchasing  additional insurance versus
are  charged  for  information  with the  result  that  the nonparticipant.  Again  given risk preference,
marginal input cost equals  the value of expected  the  requirement  for  governmental  intervention
marginal product.  Because of market failure, this  becomes  ambiguous.
would suggest a governmental institution's enter-
ing the  market  and providing  the information  to  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
producers  at a fixed  cost  (Haveman;  Demsetz;
Baumol).  The  producers  may  not  agree  on the  Investigation into the characteristics  of pest in-
quality  and  quantity  of information  that should  formation  reveals  that  it is  a joint-impact  com-
be provided, or on the level of resources devoted  modity. Thus for economic efficiency,  the possi-
to providing information.  To avoid this problem,  bility of a regulated market exists.  Consideration
it has been suggested that a governmental agency  of uncertainty,  as  well  as jointness  in  a  pro-
charge each producer at a level equivalent  to the  ducer's decision with regard to pest information,
producer's  value  of expected marginal  product.  leads  to the  following  results:  as the  degree  of
Producers  with  differing  marginal  products  of a  jointness  and  marginal  risk  tend  toward  zero,
joint-impact  good generally may not prefer being  generally  no  market  intervention  is  necessary.
exposed  to  this  type  of  discriminatory  mo-  As  pest  information  becomes  more  of  a joint-
nopolist  pricing  and  therefore  would  be  will-  impact  good,  the  problem  of equity  is  encoun-
ing  to  accept  the  equity effects  of the  markets.  tered,  and the justification  for government  inter-
Samuelson  calls  this  "Robin-Hood"  pricing.  In  vention  is  strengthened.  However,  increased
addition,  a  greater  loss  in  welfare  may  occur  marginal risk deduction between nonparticipants
through market intervention  than the net gain in  and  participants  results  in  additional  complica-
welfare  resulting  from  such  action  (Coase;  tions  in stating  that a regulated  market  for pest
Bator).  information  is  required  for  efficiency.  Thus,
The  argument  for  government  intervention  further research is required before the conclusion
into market  for information  is  further weakened  is made that pest information  should be provided.
when risk preference is considered, case four. As  by a governmental  agency.
REFERENCES
State University  Press,  1977.
Bator, F.  M.  The Question of Government Spending. New York:  Crowell-Collier,  1962.
Batra,  R.  "Resource  Allocation  in a General  Equilibrium  Model  of Production Under  Uncertainty."
J.  Econ. Theory 8(1974):50-63.
Baumol,  W. Welfare Economics. 2nd ed.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard University  Press,  1965.
Coase,  R.  H.  "The Problem  of Social  Cost." J. Law and Econ. 3(1960): 1-44.
82Demsetz,  H.  "Toward a Theory  of Property Rights." Amer. Econ. Rev.  57(1967):347-73.
Feder,  G.  "Pesticides,  Information,  and Pest Management  Under Uncertainty."  Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.
61(1979):97-103.
Hall, D. C. "The Profitability of Integrated Pest Management:  Case Studies for Cotton and Citrus in the
San Joaquin Valley."  E.  S. A. Bull.  23(1977):267-74.
Haveman,  R.  The Economics of the Public Sector. New York:  John Wiley,  1970.
Hueth,  D. and  U.  Regev.  "Optimal  Agricultural Pest Management  with Increasing  Pest Resistance."
Amer. J.  Agr. Econ. 57(1974):543-51.
Levy,  H.  and H.  M.  Markowitz.  "Approximating  Expected Utility by a Function of Mean and  Vari-
ance."  Amer. Econ. Rev.  69(1979):308-317.
Magnusson,  G. Production Under Risk: A  Theoretical Study.  Uppsala:  Almqvist and Wiksells,  1969.
Norgaard,  R.  B.  "The Economics  of Improving Pesticide  Use." Ann. Rev.  Entomol. 21(1976):45-60.
Regev,  V.,  A. P.  Gutierrez,  and G. Feder.  "Pests  as a Common Property Resource:  A  Case Study in
Alfalfa Weevil  Control." Amer. J.  Agr. Econ. 58(1976):186-97.
Samuelson,  Paul.  "Pure Theory  of Public Expenditure  and Taxation,"  in J.  Margolis and H.  Guitoon,
ed., Public Economics. New York:  St.  Martin's Press,  1969,  pp.  98-123.
Schmid,  A. A. Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics. Holt,  Rine-
hart  and Winston,  Inc.,  Praeger Publishers,  1978.
Smith,  Ronald H.  "A New  Concept  in Evaluating  IPM Programs."  Paper presented  at Fifty-Fourth
Meeting, Southeastern  Branch, Entomological  Society of America,  Biloxi, Mississippi, January
29-31,  1980.
83I